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The substantial presence of undocumented immigrants, which is a common feature in most 
developed countries, has generated debate in both Europe and America over the types of 
immigration policies that should be adopted. In the U.S, for example, with an estimated stock of 
about 11.4 million unauthorized immigrants (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012), the 
immigration policy reforms most often proposed include a mix of complementary strategies aimed 
at curbing both future flows of undocumented migrants (e.g., by intensifying controls or increasing 
sanctions) and existing stocks (through some form of legalization path). The programs subject to the 
most heated discussion are those that involve amnesty. Whereas one side stresses the need to 
recognize immigrants’ contribution to the U.S. economy, making it impractical to deport 
undocumented immigrants living within the nation’s borders, opponents argue that amnesty would 
unfairly reward law-breaking behavior and reveal the ime-inconsistency of the U.S. migration 
policy. In Europe (the EU–27), with a recent estimae of between 1.9 and 3.8 million undocumented 
immigrants but large inter-country variability in icidence over total population (Vogel et al., 2011), 
policies affecting immigrants’ legal status are often at the very core of the migration policy debate. 
In recent years, nations looking to reduce the number of undocumented residents have often 
resorted to legalization programs (Casarico et al., 2012), which in the EU have granted legal status 
to over 5 million individuals since 1996 (Brick 2011).  
In this paper, we address amnesty programs’ labor market effects on their target population of 
undocumented immigrants. More specifically, we study the effects that the prospect of legal status 
has on undocumented migrants’ employment rate, while t e received literature focuses on the labor 
market effects of gaining legal status for legalized immigrants. Indeed, amnesty programs generally 
impose some eligibility conditions, which immediately differentiate potential applicants from 
ineligible undocumented immigrants. We propose a stylized conceptual framework to help 
understanding how the prospect of legal status may shift labor demand and supply of undocumented 
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immigrants even before legal status is actually granted.1 We show that the possibility of applying 
for amnesty per se has significant labor market consequences. For the first time, we empirically 
sign and quantify the effect of the prospect of becoming legal on undocumented workers’ 
employment outcomes. In doing so, we explore labor ma ket effects that, although essential for a 
complete analysis of amnesty program outcomes, haveso far been overlooked. Remarkably, pre- 
and post-legalization employment effects may have opposite sign. An accurate assessment of 
amnesty programs’ overall impact, therefore, requires consideration of their effects both during the 
application period (when undocumented immigrants become eligible and apply for amnesty) and 
after legalization of successful applicants. Our data allow us to focus on the former effect, thus 
complementing the results from previous studies. 
To identify the causal effect of the prospect of legal status on undocumented immigrants’ 
employment probability, we innovatively exploit a natural experiment provided by the 2002 
legalization program in Italy. The program conditioned eligibility on both a predetermined 
minimum residence requirement and on being employed at the time of application. As we discuss in 
our conceptual framework section, such an amnesty design produces ambiguous employment 
effects. Furthermore, the retrospective and unpredictable threshold based on date of arrival in Italy 
exogenously assigns undocumented immigrants into one of two groups: those who arrived in Italy 
before the threshold date (treatment group) and those who arrived after (control group). We exploit 
this quasi-experimental setting, together with a uniq e dataset of undocumented immigrants, to 
construct an almost “ ideal comparison group: ... a randomly selected group f undocumented 
immigrants similar to the target group, but ineligible for, and unaffected by, the amnesty” (Kaushal 
2006, p. 635). This design improves on extant research, which had generally to rely on arbitrary 
control groups of documented migrants or natives.  
 
                                                 
1 The mechanisms we analyze may also be in place with visa sponsorship schemes that condition the issuance nd/or 
renewal of residence permit on having an employer willing to support the application. These policies are commonly 
adopted in major immigration countries and our results can shed some light on their labor market effects. 
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Several papers investigate whether amnesty is an appropriate policy tool to address 
undocumented migration (e.g., Chau, 2001).2 Whereas some examine amnesty’s possible effects on 
future undocumented migrant flows (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2003) or on the labor market outcomes 
of natives (Cobb-Clark et al., 1995; Chassamboulli and Peri, 2015), others assess amnesty 
programs’ general effect on their target population of undocumented immigrants with a particular 
focus on changes in labor market outcomes experienced by legalized immigrants.3  
According to all the theoretical channels highlighted in the literature, gaining legal status 
unambiguously increases wages, wage growth, and returns o skills for employed immigrants, while 
the effect on employment is theoretically undetermined.4 On the demand side, matches with 
documented immigrants may be more valuable for employers (as they cannot be exogenously 
interrupted by a worker’s deportation) but may also imply higher costs. On the supply side, instead, 
the overall effect depends on the relative size of income and substitution effects. Indeed, the 
empirical literature consistently observes that newly legalized immigrants have higher wages after 
legalization than before (see, e.g., Borjas and Tienda, 1993; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002; 
Kaushal, 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2007) althoug  the employment effect remains empirically 
unclear.5 Most of these empirical studies exploit the variation in legal status induced by the Legally 
                                                 
2 For the theoretical and empirical debate on alternative migration control policies to deal with undocumented 
immigration (border controls, domestic enforcement, tc.) see, among others, Ethier (1986), Hanson and Spilimbergo 
(1999), Hanson (2006), Facchini and Testa (2011) and Bohn et al. (2014). 
3A few other papers examine the impact of legal statu  on outcomes outside the labor market, such as remittances 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari, 2010), consumption (Dustmann et al., forthcoming) and crime (Mastrobuoni and 
Pinotti, 2015), while a related strand of literature addresses the labor market effects of naturalization (Bratsberg et al., 
2002; Mazzolari, 2009). See Fasani (2015) for a survey of empirical papers on immigrants' outcomes and legal status. 
4The main theoretical channels identified in the litra ure are better employer-employee matching (becaus  of such 
factors as increased geographical and occupational mobility, reduced risk in job search activity, and access to formal 
recruiting channels), higher bargaining power, and eligibility for social programs (e.g., Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Bansak, 2011). 
5For instance, Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2007) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2011) find that both male and female 
newly legalized workers experience lower employment, which results in higher unemployment for men and lower 
participation for women. Kaushal (2006), however, identifies only a statistically insignificant effect on employment, 
whereas Pan (2012) finds a positive relation but only for female immigrants. 
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Authorized Workers (LAW) program—one of the legalizt on programs introduced in the U.S. by 
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)—and use data from the Legalized 
Population Survey (LPS), a longitudinal survey of immigrants who obtained legal status through 
that particular program.6 The LAW-IRCA amnesty, which granted legal status to more than 1.6 
million immigrants, was open to aliens with a minimu  length of residence in the U.S. of about 
four years. Two other nationality-specific amnesty programs examined in the U.S. context are the 
1992 Chinese Student Protection Act (CSPA; Orrenius et al., 2012) and the 1997 Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA; Kaushal, 2006), which imposed a 
minimum residence requirement for legal status eligibi ty. 7 Comparison groups used in the 
literature include legal foreign-born population (Borjas and Tienda, 1993), legal Latino immigrants 
(Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark, 2002), legal immigrants from a selected group of Latin American 
countries (Kaushal, 2006), and a subsample of Hispan c natives (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 
2011). Three recent papers (Barcellos (2010), Lozan and Sorensen (2011) and Pan (2012)) exploit 
the discontinuity in eligibility for legal status created by the cut-off date (January 1, 1982) of the 
LAW-IRCA program).8   
Conceptual framework 
 
Our conceptual framework is centered on our primary research question: What effect does the 
prospect of legal status have on undocumented migrants’ employment rate? As already emphasized, 
the focus of this question differs from that in previous research, which addresses the labor market 
effect of gaining legal status. Because these potential pre-legalization effects may depend on 
                                                 
6The LPS contains information about a sample of 6,193 undocumented migrants living in the U.S. in 1986/87 who 
sought legal permanent residence through LAW-IRCA. The survey data were collected from the entire group in 1989, 
and again (from 4,012 of these respondents) in 1992 (see, e.g., Borjas and Tienda 1993; Rivera-Batiz 1999; Kossoudji 
and Cobb-Clark, 2000; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 
2011; Pan, 2012). 
7The CSPA, designed to prevent political persecution of Chinese students in the aftermath of the Tiananmen protests of 
1989, granted permanent residency to all Chinese nationals who arrived in the U.S. on or before April 11, 1990. The 
NACARA, enacted in November 1997, granted legal statu  to about 450,000 immigrants from Nicaragua, Guatem la, 
Cuba, and El Salvador (if in the U.S. since 1990), together with their spouses and children (if continuously in the U.S. 
since December 1995). 
8 All these papers face severe data limitations (legal status and year of arrival in the U.S. are, respectively, not observed 
and only partially observed) that make it hard to isolate the true effects of legalization.   
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amnesty program design, they should definitely be considered when assessing a program’s overall 
effects.9 There is substantial heterogeneity in the eligibility requirements that amnesty programs set 
for granting legal status. Most amnesty programs base eligibility on some predetermined individual 
condition (e.g. minimum residence condition, past employment), aimed at preventing new inflows 
of undocumented immigrants. Any predetermined requir ment affects employers’ relative demand 
for eligible versus ineligible immigrants prior to legalization. The direction of the demand shift is 
ambiguous: On the one hand, the prospect of legalization increases the value of the matches because 
they become more stable; on the other, these matches are more expensive because of pay-roll 
taxes/regularization fees. Amnesty can also require ndocumented immigrants to be employed at 
the moment of application, as it has been the case for most amnesty programs launched in Southern 
European countries (Chauvin et al. 2013; Kraler 2009). In addition to these demand effects, 
employment-conditional amnesty that requires immigrants to be employed at the time of application 
also shifts the labor supply of undocumented immigrants (before legalization). In fact, the value of 
being employed is increased by the prospect of obtaining legal status, inducing a reduction in 
potential applicants’ reservation wages and, therefore, increasing their labor supply. The net change 
in the surplus of potential matches remains ambiguous because of the indeterminacy of labor 
demand shifts.10 Note that the pre-amnesty supply-side effect we describe has opposite sign with 
respect to the effect that is generally expected from legalization (i.e. a negative labor supply shift, 
due to improved outside options and higher reservation wages). Ignoring the positive shift in labor 
supply occurring before legalization may thus lead to misleading conclusions on the overall 
employment effects of an amnesty.  
                                                 
9In the online appendix A1, we throw some light on this as yet unexplored issue using a novel conceptual framework. 
We develop a simple Nash bargaining model where we capture the prospect of legalization in three comple entary 
ways: a lower apprehension probability for potentially eligible undocumented workers, a positive pay-roll 
tax/legalization fee on firms, and a premium that immigrants associate with being legalized. This framework implies 
that the possibility of future legal status modifies the job match surplus—defined as the difference between the 
maximum wage a firm is willing to pay to employ and undocumented worker and the immigrant’s reservation wage—
for undocumented immigrants who can be legalized compared to those who cannot, and thus their relative employment 
rate. 
10 We identify the conditions under which the prospect of legal status unambiguously increases the job match surplus in 
the online appendix A1. 
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The amnesty program we study in this paper entails both a predetermined condition and a 
current employment requirement. This type of legalization splits undocumented immigrants into 
one group that satisfies the first requirement and other that does not. Throughout the paper, we 
define these two groups as “qualified” and “unqualified”, respectively. Conditional on 
having/finding a job, only the former group becomes fully eligible for legal status, meaning that 
amnesty with such a design shifts both labor demand  supply—but only for qualified 
immigrants. Those who do not satisfy the predetermined condition (the unqualified) are left out of 
the legalization process and experience no change in job match surplus. This surplus differential can 
in turn be expected to affect both job retention and job finding rates and, ultimately, relative 
employment rates. For instance, if the surplus associated with qualified immigrants is higher than 
that linked to unqualified immigrants, we expect that the former will have higher job retention and 
higher job finding rates, leading in turn to a progressively higher employment rate among the 
qualified immigrants after the announcement of amnesty. If being qualified reduces the net job 
match surplus, on the other hand, the reverse will be true.  
In sum, under the plausible assumption that the job match surplus for qualified immigrants is 
greater than that for unqualified immigrants, we expect a higher employment rate for the former 
group. Although in principle this implication could be tested by regressing undocumented 
immigrants’ employment status on an indicator for being qualified (i.e., satisfying the 
predetermined eligibility condition), retrieving a c usal parameter from such a regression requires 
random assignment of the qualified status to the immigrant population. The design of the 2002 
Italian regularization program and the uniqueness of our data permit us for the first time to address 




A Natural Experiment 
The 2002 Italian Amnesty 
 
The natural experiment analyzed here is an amnesty for undocumented workers deliberated by 
the Italian government on September 9, 2002, and mae effective the next day (Decree-Law no. 
195/2002). This amnesty, Italy’s largest legalization process ever with over 700 thousand 
applications, offered a renewable two-year work and residence permit to all undocumented 
immigrants who could find an employer willing to legally hire them under a minimum one year 
contract at a minimum monthly salary (439 euros) and pay an amnesty fee (330 euros for domestic 
workers and 800 euros for all other workers).11 Unlike all previous amnesties granted in Italy, the
applications had to be filed directly by the employers rather than the immigrants. Importantly, 
employers were also asked to declare that they had continuously employed the immigrant for the 
three months before the legalization law was passed, that is since June 11, 2002. It is crucial to note 
that this last condition was only formally a predetermined employment requirement, but it was
effectively a predetermined residence requirement. Indeed, all employment relationships of 
undocumented immigrants are by definition informal and unknown to the authorities. As such, their 
exact duration is hardly measurable and clearly not verifiable, making the past employment 
requirement not enforceable. Coherently, the amnesty application procedure did not require 
employers to prove in any way the duration of immigrants’ past employment, and simply requested 
them to pay a fee roughly equivalent to three months of overdue social security contributions. 
Nevertheless, a necessary condition for immigrants to have been employed since June 11, 2002 was 
that they had arrived in Italy before that date. This condition was actually verifiable. The amnesty 
application form, indeed, required stating the exact d te of arrival in Italy and attaching copies of all 
passport pages to the application form. It is worth noting that the vast majority of undocumented 
                                                 
11 Legalization of immigrant workers did not extend to family members.  
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immigrants in Italy are visa overstayers (up to 70 percent, according to data from the Italian 
Ministry of Internal Affairs for the 2000–2006 period; Fasani, 2010), whose presence in Italy before 
June 11, 2002, could be established by the visa stamp on the passport and the Italian police records. 
In addition, in the case of amnesty applications being checked, immigrants arrived before the 
threshold date were more able to provide documentatio  supporting their eligibility (e.g. money 
transfer receipts, medical records, mobile phone contracts). Making false statements in the amnesty 
application was a punishable criminal offence, and therefore providing information that could be 
easily falsified could not only lead to the rejection of the application but, potentially, also to a 
criminal charge against the employer.12 Filing an amnesty application for an undocumented 
immigrant truly arrived before June 11, 2002, would instead have a higher chance of success and 
would not imply any risk for the employer. 
Applications could be submitted during a two-month period - from September 10 to November 
13, 2002 - beginning on the day the amnesty was approved. After the submission deadline, Italian 
police authorities began screening the applications a d summoning successful employers and 
immigrants to sign their employment contracts. Only when this last stage had been successfully 
completed was the residence permit granted. The amnesty simultaneously legalized both the 
residence status and the employment contract of succe sful applicants and it implied  that the Italian 
authorities could not prosecute employers and employees for any of the past law infringements 
reported in the application (e.g., undeclared employment, tax evasion, unauthorized entry and 
residence). Protection from deportation of the undocumented applicants was also granted during the 
screening process. It took almost two years for screening process to be completed and 
approximately 95 percent of applicants eventually received legal status.  
                                                 
12The submission of false statements or documents to the Italian authorities in the application for amnesty was 
punishable with up to nine months of detention (and possibly more, if the false declarations were recognized as a more 
serious offence, such as fraud or corruption). About 20 per cent of unsuccessful applicants was sentenced to expulsion 




The time frame of the amnesty program is sketched in Figure 1, in which qualified and 
unqualified immigrants are those who arrived in Italy before and fter June 11, 2002.  
 
[Figure 1 approximately here] 
 
Because the 2002 Italian amnesty program entails both a predetermined condition and a current 
employment requirement, we expect it to modify the job retention rate of qualified immigrants, 
thereby creating a difference in their employment rate compared to unqualified immigrants (see 
next section). Nor, however, can we rule out the possibility that immigrants who arrived before that 
date but were not employed when amnesty was announced might also experience a change in their 
job finding rate. In fact, as long as the migrant had been in Italy at least since June 11, 2002, 
employers willing to hire this worker and apply for amnesty could easily make a false declaration 
that the employment relationship had begun before the threshold date.13  
 Identification Strategy 
 
In our empirical analysis, we exploit the discontinuity created by the retrospective condition of 
arrival date in Italy to identify the causal effect of the prospect of legalization on the employment 
status of undocumented immigrants. The unexpected and unpredictable nature of this discontinuity 
generates a quasi-random assignment of undocumented immigrants around the threshold date. Even 
though the granting of amnesty was intensely debated within the government coalition, received 
wide coverage in the Italian media, and might have be n foreseeable based on the frequency and 
regularity of earlier general amnesties (in 1986, 1990, 1995 and 1998; see Fasani, 2010), two 
crucial and intertwined aspects could not have been predicted even by very well-informed 
                                                 
13It is worth noting that the possibility for immigrants and employers to provide false statements is not specific to this 
particular amnesty or to the Italian context. Serious limitations in authorities’ ability to verify statements contained in 
applications arise with any amnesty attempting to in roduce eligibility rules for legal status. For instance, the U.S. the 
1986 IRCA-SAW program legalized over 1.2 million una thorized immigrants conditional on their having been 
employed in the agricultural sector. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service concluded that it was nearly 
impossible to distinguish a legitimate from a fraudulent SAW application (see Gonzalez Baker, 1990). 
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immigrants. First, it was impossible to forecast if and when the Italian government would reach a 
consensus and actually pass an amnesty law; second, it was equally difficult to predict the exact 
criteria for eligibility; in particular, the length of the minimum residence in Italy.14 The uncertainty 
about these two aspects makes the retrospective arri al threshold completely ex-ante unpredictable 
for immigrants, thus preventing endogenous sorting around it. This unpredictable discontinuity 
creates a local randomized experiment (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010); that is, there is no 
reason to expect significant differences in (observable and unobservable) characteristics between 
immigrants who arrived immediately before and immediately after June 11, 2002.  
The experiment is local because outside the neighborhood of the threshold we can expect a 
substantial selection into eligibility as potential immigrants keen on becoming legal residents 
intensified and accelerated their attempts to arrive in Italy in time for amnesty. If the unobserved 
characteristics determining these individuals’ migration behavior (e.g., networks, credit constraints) 
are correlated with their employment outcomes in Italy, this selection would introduce a bias into 
our estimates. We therefore remove this bias by comparing only individuals who arrived in Italy in 
a neighborhood of the threshold date.  
Data and Estimation 
In this paper, we use a unique dataset collected by Naga, a large Italian NGO founded in 1987 that 
offers free basic health care exclusively to undocumented immigrants.15 Providing a daily average 
of over 60 health care visits 5 days a week, this as ociation does not discriminate against 
immigrants in any way according to nationality and/or religion. Naga has only one branch, located 
in a fairly central and well-connected area of Milan, the second largest Italian city, whose province 
                                                 
14The length of this minimum residence period could not be inferred from previous amnesties. Indeed, the amnesties in 
1998 and in 1990 required seven and two months of minimum residence in Italy, respectively, while the amnesties 
approved in 1986 and 1995 made no such stipulation—undocumented immigrants simply had to prove they had been in 
Italy at least since the day before the law was passed. None of the previous amnesties included an employ ent 
requirement. 
15Documented immigrants are completely integrated into the Italian National Health Service, so if they seek medical 
assistance at Naga, the staff redirects them to public hospitals. 
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was home to 3.7 million inhabitants in 2002 (6.5 percent of the Italian population), about 150 
thousand of them legally resident immigrants (9.7 percent of the foreign population in the country). 
The province received 87 thousand applications for the 2002 amnesty, which amounts to about 12 
percent of total amnesty applications. Data were colle ted by volunteers on each immigrant’s first 
visit to Naga using a brief questionnaire that profiled immigrants’ social and economic situation at 
the time of interview (gender, age, education, country of origin, month of arrival in Italy, current 
employment status). Unfortunately, this information s not updated after the first visit. These data, 
available in electronic format since 2000, constitute a cross-sectional dataset of daily observations 
on undocumented immigrants.16  
This dataset offers two major advantages: First, when used in conjunction with the quasi-
experimental setting created by the 2002 amnesty, it allows us to create an almost ideal comparison 
group of undocumented immigrants randomly excluded from applying for amnesty (Kaushal, 
2006). Second, the availability of daily observations allows us to analyze the employment status of 
undocumented immigrants at different points in time.  
The main shortcoming of the dataset, however, is that i  includes only individuals who visited 
the Naga premises for medical care. The vast majority f them attend Naga for basic and temporary 
medical needs while treatment for emergency and chronic disease is offered by the Italian National 
Health Service. The sample selection does not threaten our identification strategy because the 
exogeneity of the cut-off arrival day ensures that t e selection into Naga should not systematically 
differ between qualified and unqualified immigrants.17 In order to investigate the extent of this 
selection, in the online appendix Table A 1 we compare the Naga sample with the ISMU sample, a 
random sample of undocumented immigrants living in M lan (ISMU data are described in footnote 
                                                 
16An earlier version of this dataset was used in Devillanova (2008), to which we refer for an accurate description of the 
data and individual variables. 
17These data limitations should be assessed bearing in mind the intrinsic difficulties of researching undocumented 
migration: given that one ignores both the size and characteristics of such a population, extracting a truly representative 
sample is simply not possible. Such is even more the case when the object of analysis, as in our paper, is the population 
of recently arrived undocumented immigrants, whose elusiveness is magnified. Our dataset shares this lim tation with 
any other sample used in the literature on undocumented immigrants (e.g., the LPS dataset is a random sa ple of the 
self-selected subpopulation of applicants for the LAW-IRCA amnesty). 
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25). We find that the two datasets are very similar, although Naga tends to oversample women, 
which is consistent with the well-established fact that women have higher levels of health care 
utilization than men (Bertakis et al. 2000; Redondo-Sendino et al. 2006).  
To estimate the causal effect of the prospect of obtaining legal status on employment 
probability, we look at migrants arriving in Italy around the amnesty threshold date (June 11, 2002) 
and compare the employment rate of those who entered before this threshold (qualified) with those 
who entered after (unqualified). Although ideally the treatment and comparison groups should 
include only those immigrants who arrived in Italy on the day before or after the arrival threshold, 
this procedure is infeasible because our dataset precisely records only the month and year of entry 
into Italy. We therefore assign individuals to the tr atment and comparison group according to 
month of arrival, excluding all those who arrived in June 2002 because we cannot determine 
whether they arrived before or after June 11. We then define as qualified (the treatment group) all 
immigrants who arrived in April and May 2002 and as unqualified (the control group) all those who 
arrived in July and August 2002.18 Individuals who arrived outside of these months are excluded 
from the analysis. 
For both groups, we measure the employment rate at he same point in time in order to keep 
constant the overall labor market conditions to which the immigrants were exposed. The availability 
of daily observations in our dataset allows for a high degree of flexibility in choosing when to 
measure migrant employment. It would of course be preferable to examine employment status the 
day after amnesty closed (November 14, 2002) when all applications had been submitted but no one 
had yet been legalized. However, to increase the sample size, we need to extend our observation 
window. We face a trade-off between having a larger sample size and introducing an amnesty-
induced sample selection: the further away from the amnesty deadline, the more likely that amnesty 
                                                 
18To check the robustness of our results, we further restrict the neighborhood around the eligibility threshold by 
comparing those who arrived in May 2002 with those who arrived in July 2002. The results are qualitatively similar, 
although the sample size shrinks. 
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applicants have gained legal status and disappeared from our sample.19 We use a two months 
observation window (14 November - 13 January), which also coincides with the screening period 
initially envisaged by the amnesty bill.20 Figure 2 summarizes the time structure of our analysis. 
 
[Figure 2 approximately here] 
 
By construction, individuals in the treatment group have spent more time in Italy than those in 
the control group. Because time spent in the host cuntry is a key determinant of immigrants’ labor 
market integration, a finding that qualified immigrants have a higher employment rate than 
unqualified immigrants might simply reflect different average residence spells. We address this 
potential threat to our identification strategy using a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting. 
Specifically, using data from two years before and two years after 2002, we check whether 
significantly different employment rates between April–May immigrant arrivals and July–August 
immigrant arrivals were also in place during non-amnesty years. We construct consistent samples 
for amnesty and non-amnesty years: For each year t in the 2000–2004 interval, our main sample 
contains undocumented immigrants observed at Naga between November 14 t and January 13 t+1 
who had arrived in Italy in April, May, July, or Aug st of the same year t. 
We then estimate the following linear probability model: 
2002it i i t it t itEMPL APMAY APMAY Y X uα β γ τ= + × + + +                                  (1) 
where EMPLit is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i who arrived in Italy in year t is 
employed and zero otherwise. Similarly, APMAYi is a dummy variable equal to one for immigrants 
who arrived in April or May and equal to zero for those who arrived in July or August of every year 
                                                 
19In fact, not only those actually legalized but also th se who had applied for amnesty but were still waiting were 
entitled to receive free medical care from the National Health Service and so were no longer admitted to Naga. This 
process, however, involved some administrative delay and some learning on all sides—migrants, public hospitals, and 
Naga volunteers—so in the weeks immediately after th  amnesty deadline, applicants in need of medical assistance still 
had to turn to Naga. As time passed, however, applicants tended to disappear from the sample. 
20 Decree-Law no. 195/2002, article 4. Our results hold when using different observation windows after the amnesty 
deadline (one, two and three months). Results are available upon request. 
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t, which captures any systematic difference in employment probability between the two groups. tτ  
is a full set of year dummies for the 2000–2004 period that captures all year-specific labor market 
features equally affecting all individuals in the sample, Xit is a vector of individual control variables, 
and uit is an idiosyncratic shock. The interaction term 2002i tAPMAY Y× identifies qualified 
immigrants; that is, those who arrived in April or May in the amnesty year 2002. Our main 
coefficient of interest is β, which measures the difference in employment probability between 
qualified and unqualified undocumented immigrants. Following on from our discussion, the sign of 
this coefficient is theoretically ambiguous: whereas supply should unambiguously increase in 
response to the prospect of legal status, the direction of shifts in labor demand is unclear. Hence, a 
positive and significant coefficient would suggest that the prospect of legal status (i.e., being 
qualified) significantly increases the surplus of job matches with immigrants who can be legalized, 
leading to a higher probability of being employed. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A in Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main sample, while in the next two panels 
we differentiate between immigrants arrived in April-May and immigrants arrived in July-August in 
year 2002 (Panel B) and in the non-amnesty years 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 (Panel C). The 
average age of the sample is almost 31, with 52 percent being male. The education level is high: 
about 42 percent has attended high school, while about 9 percent has some university education. In 
panel B, we show that the differences between the qualified and the unqualified group in these 
variables are never statistically significant at 5 percent. We find a similar pattern in non-amnesty 
years (panel C). The distribution of areas of origin is slightly different between the two groups in 
both amnesty and non-amnesty years, suggesting a seasonality in undocumented flows from 
different source countries that is completely unrelated to the 2002 amnesty. In our empirical 
analysis, we always report both conditional and unconditional estimates. About half of the 
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regression sample is employed. Our data identify as employed all immigrants who reported having 
a paid job at the time of interview at Naga. We have no information on number of hours worked per 
week or on wages. Remarkably, the employment probability is not statistically different at 5 percent 
for immigrants arrived in April-May and immigrants arrived in July-August, but in the amnesty 
year: in 2002, the employment probability of qualified immigrants is 23 percentage points higher 
than the one of unqualified immigrants. This difference between the two groups is attributable to 
both a higher share of employed workers in the group f qualified immigrants and to a lower share 
of employed workers among unqualified immigrants in 2002 relative to other years. Although this 
descriptive evidence may suggest that our control gup was somehow affected by the 2002 
amnesty, in the robustness checks we use alternative control groups to show that this was not the 
case.  
 
[Table 1 approximately here] 
 
Figure 3, based on the almost 14 thousand individuals with at most 12 months of residence in 
Italy who are in the Naga dataset in the 2000–2004 period, illustrates the evolution of these 
undocumented immigrants’ employment probability over their first year of residence in Italy. It is 
immediately apparent that the employment rate of recently arrived undocumented immigrants 
changes considerably with time spent in the host country. Only 12 percent of immigrants with one 
month of residence in Italy report having a job, but the share of employed immigrants increases by 
roughly 10 percentage points for each additional month, reaching 40 percent after four months. The 
profile then tends to become somewhat flatter, stabilizing around 60 percent for immigrants with a 
residence duration of 10 months or more. In general, therefore, the employment probability of 
undocumented immigrants increases 50 percentage points during the first year after arrival in Italy. 
  




Descriptive evidence in Table 1 shows that observable individual characteristics are evenly 
distributed in our treatment and control groups, which also serves as a test of treatment status 
randomness. Although the ex-ante unpredictability of the retrospective arrival threshold prevented 
immigrants to endogenously sort around it, there are still two types of potential concerns regarding 
the observed composition of our sample. First, althoug  one important advantage of our dataset is 
that it is based on the information immigrants repoted to an independent NGO - and thus they had 
no clear motivation to falsely report their date of arrival to Naga volunteers - we cannot completely 
rule out the possibility of misreporting.21 Specifically, we might fear that employed undocumented 
immigrants in the unqualified group would falsely report an earlier arrival date in order to appear as 
eligible for the amnesty. A second concern is that pat erns of return migration might have differed 
among qualified and unqualified immigrants. In particular, one may worry that the former had more 
incentives to remain in Italy to enjoy the future reward of legal status than the latter. Selective 
outmigration, however, is unlikely to be a major issue in our analysis, given the very short time 
window we consider. 
We can empirically test for evidence of either source of bias by comparing the reported 
distribution of months of arrival of immigrants going to Naga in 2002 and in non-amnesty years. In 
the presence of selective outmigration and/or misreporting, we should observe that those who went 
to Naga in the Fall of 2002 were systematically more likely to report arriving in Italy before June of 
the same year than immigrants who went to Naga in the Fall of non-amnesty years. In the online 
Appendix 2, we empirically test for this implication, finding no evidence in this direction. Our 
empirical exercise is analogous to the McCrary (2008) test. 
                                                 
21 Whether the Italian authorities would judge immigrants’ applications as eligible or not for amnesty was completely 
independent of their answers to Naga volunteers. In addition, Naga is an independent NGO that does not exchange 
information with the Italian authorities, an independ nce of which undocumented immigrants are aware and the precise 






We start by estimating our main difference-in-differences regression (1). We report results from 
linear probability models and we account for the heteroskedasticity this choice implies by using 
robust standard errors.22 Table 2 reports the estimates of the main coefficint of interest in our DiD 
exercise: the interaction between the dummy for April–May (versus July–August) arrival in each 
year and the dummy for the amnesty year 2002. Each cell in the table reports the estimated 
coefficient from a separate regression. Column 1 reports the unconditional estimates, while the 
following three columns gradually add further groups of control variables (gender, age, and 
education; area of origin dummies; month dummies). We maintain this structure throughout the rest 
of the paper. 
 
[Table 2 approximately here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the impact of amnesty on employment probability is positive, 
strongly significant, and remarkably stable across different specifications. If we focus on the fully 
specified model (column 4), we find that the prospect of obtaining legal status increases 
undocumented immigrants’ employment probability by 26.2 percentage points, with a coefficient 
that is significant at the 1 percent level.23 Based on our theoretical discussion, this result suggests 
that the prospect of legal status increases the net surplus of job matches with qualified immigrants, 
leading to a higher employment rate among this group of immigrant workers. This larger surplus is 
the result of theoretically ambiguous shifts in labor demand and of an unambiguously positive shift 
in labor supply. 
                                                 
22 In unreported regressions, we have checked the robustness of our findings to using probit or logit regression models. 
Results are available upon request. 
23 In unreported regressions, we test for heterogeneity in the eligibility effect on employment, by including additional 
interactions with gender and education level. Point estimates suggest a slightly stronger effect for wmen, although the 




Yet how large is the estimated effect? Recently arrived undocumented immigrants have a very 
low probability of being employed but tend to experience sharp increases in their employment rates 
in the first few months after arrival; specifically, about a 50 percentage point increase within the 
first 12 months. Hence, the prospect of obtaining le a  status accelerates the labor market 
integration of newly arrived undocumented immigrants by about half the increase in employment 
they normally experience in their first year after arrival. 
Using the difference-in-differences setup of equation (1) we can check whether before the 
amnesty the employment status differs between the two groups. This is a compelling test of 
treatment status randomness. Given that before the deliberation on the amnesty bill qualified and 
unqualified immigrants were indistinguishable, their employment probability should not have 
systematically differed. Finding evidence against this conjecture would imply an immediate loss of 
credibility for our entire empirical exercise. Indeed, the common trend assumption would be 
immediately falsified if the employment rates of the two groups were already diverging before the 
amnesty. Bearing in mind that the amnesty was announced on the 10th of September 2002 and that 
our control group are all those arrived in July and August, we are left only with the first nine days 
of September and a few observations to perform this empirical exercise. In order to have a 
reasonable sample size, we extend the observation windo  to the whole month of September. This 
choice is conservative for our purpose, meaning that i  makes it more likely to find a statistical 
significant difference in the employment probability between the two groups because it includes 
twenty days (September 11-September 30) during which qualified immigrants (and employers) 
could potentially react to the amnesty announcement.  
Results for our coefficient of interest estimated in September are reported in panel B of Table 2 
(“Initial difference”). Note that column 4 is not reported because using one single month of 
observations we cannot identify month dummies. As Table 2 shows, the point difference between 
the two groups’ employment rates is close to zero and not statistically significant in any 
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specification. Reassuringly, the substantial difference in employment rate we observe after the 
application period ended (panel A) did not pre-exist the amnesty announcement.  
 Robustness Checks 
 
To check the robustness of our results, we first run a falsification test using placebo arrival 
thresholds. If our estimations truly capture the effect of the prospect of legal status, we should find 
no systematic differences in employment within the groups of qualified or unqualified immigrants. 
Indeed, all qualified immigrants should be as intensely affected by the policy, while all unqualified 
immigrants should remain totally unaffected. To verify that placebo thresholds have no significant 
effects, we first estimate our DiD regressions with the actual threshold (June 11) replaced by a 
placebo threshold of April 1 and compare qualified immigrants who arrived in February–March 
with those arrived in April–May. As an alternative, we also split the group of qualified immigrants 
used in the main analysis (those who arrived in April–May) into two subgroups: those who arrived 
in April versus those who arrived in May, implying a threshold date of May 1 (see Figure A 1). The 
first and second rows of Table 3 report the results for the April 1 and May 1 thresholds, 
respectively. As before, column 1 reports the unconditional estimates, and columns 2–4 gradually 
include additional controls. 
  
[Table 3 approximately here] 
 
The next two rows of Table 3 display the results from similar placebo tests performed only on 
the population of unqualified immigrants. First, in row three, we compare the group of unqualified 
immigrants used in our main analysis (i.e., those who arrived in July–August) with those who 
arrived in the following two months (September-October), and then, in the fourth row, we split the 
July–August group into two subgroups (July versus Agust). Again, this division is equivalent to 
setting two alternative placebo thresholds on September 1 and August 1, respectively. The results in 
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Table 3, far from falsifying our findings, strongly support their validity. Regardless of whether the 
threshold is moved forward or back by one month or two, we find no effect of placebo qualified 
status on the employment status of undocumented immigrants. I  fact, none of the coefficients of 
interest obtained from these 16 placebo regressions is even marginally statistically significant.  
Our second set of robustness checks is designed to verify that the results are not driven by the 
inclusion of specific non-amnesty years in the estimating sample. For this set, we replicate our main 
results using the two years after amnesty (2003 and 2004), the year before and after amnesty (2001 
and 2003) and the two years before amnesty (2000 and 2001), reported in Panel A of Table 4. All 
results are fully robust to changes in the set of control years. Panel B of Table 4 shows that also our 
estimates of the initial differences between the two groups are unaffected. 
 
[Table 4 approximately here] 
 
In our third falsification exercise, based on placebo amnesty years, we run DiD regressions in 
which 2002 is dropped from the sample and each of the remaining non-amnesty years is 
alternatively given placebo amnesty status. Reassuringly, the resulting estimates of both the 
amnesty effect (Panel A) and of the “initial difference” (Panel B) are generally very close to zero 
and never statistically significant. 
 
[Table 5 approximately here] 
 
Further, to ensure that the earlier estimated employment differential between qualified and 
unqualified immigrants originates exclusively from events in year 2002 and not from (unexplained) 
changes in other non-amnesty years, we estimate the following equation separately for each year in 
our sample: 
                            i i i iEMPL a bAPMAY X c ε= + + +                                                    (2) 
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where the employment status of undocumented migrants is regressed on a dummy for arrival in 
April–May and other individual controls. This specification, unlike our previous DiD estimates, 
fails to control for the different average permanence in Italy of individuals in the treatment and 
control groups. Table 6 reports year-by-year estimates for equation (2), with each cell in the table 
corresponding to the estimated coefficient on the April–May dummy. We first perform this exercise 
in the year of amnesty (2002) and then in each of the four non-amnesty years (2000, 2001, 2003, 
and 2004). Our findings fully corroborate our previous results: As expected, we find a positive and 
significant effect of having arrived in April–May (rather than in July–August) only in year 2002. 
 
[Table 6 approximately here] 
 
Finally, we check the robustness of our results to the choice of alternative control groups. As 
argued above, our comparison group is very close to the ideal one: “(...) a randomly selected group 
of undocumented immigrants similar to the target group, but ineligible for, and unaffected by, the 
amnesty..." (Kaushal 2006, p.635). The only aspect where our control group may depart from this 
ideal definition regards the possibility that its me bers may have been directly affected by the 
policy, given that qualified and unqualified immigrants compete in the same local labor market.  
We address this concern by using alternative control groups of legal immigrants and natives that, 
although less comparable to our treatment group, are unlikely to be affected by the amnesty. Table 7 
reports results from estimating DiD regressions where qualified and, separately, unqualified 
immigrants in the Naga sample are compared to five d ff rent control groups. These groups are 
defined as: i) legal immigrants who have spent lessthan four years in Italy and live in Milan; ii) 
legal immigrants who have spent less than four years in Italy and live in Lombardy; iii) legal 
immigrants who have spent less than two years in Italy and live in Milan; iv) legal immigrants who 
have spent less than two years in Italy and live in Lombardy; v) all legal residents (immigrants and 
natives) of Lombardy. In all cases, the control group is restricted to individuals aged 15 to 40. For 
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each control group, we first consider only unskilled (at most secondary education) individuals 
(columns 1-6), and we then include all levels of education (columns 7-12). Data on legal migrants 
are taken from an annual survey administered by the ISMU foundation to around 8,000 documented 
and undocumented immigrants in Lombardy (the region in which Milan is situated).24 Data on the 
whole resident population of Lombardy instead come from the EU Labor Force Survey (EULFS; 
fourth quarter).  
 
[Table 7 approximately here] 
 
Irrespectively of the control group considered, estima ion results for qualified immigrants (columns 
1-3 and 7-9) are remarkably similar to our baseline estimates: we find a positive, sizeable and 
statistically significant increase in employment rate in the amnesty year compared to non-amnesty 
year. Results for unqualified immigrants (columns 4-6 and 10-12), instead, have generally a 
negative sign but are substantially smaller in absolute value and never statistically significant at any 
conventional level. These additional results rule out any major concern that general equilibrium 
effects from the treatment to the control group in the NAGA sample are driving the main findings 
of our empirical analysis. 
 
Additional Results: Persistence of the Employment Effect 
 
Our results so far indicate that the prospect of legal status under the 2002 Italian amnesty caused 
a substantial increase in the employment rate of qualified undocumented immigrants, which raises 
the policy-relevant question of this effect’s persistence. Unfortunately, because the Naga sample is 
                                                 
24ISMU is an independent research foundation that promotes studies on immigration. The ISMU data are sampled using 
an intercept point survey methodology based on the tendency of immigrants to cluster at certain locations (McKenzie 
and Mistiaen, 2009). The ISMU survey provides a representative sample of the total migrant population residing in the 
Lombardy region. The interview questionnaire contains a variety of questions on individual characterisics (e.g., 
demographics, educational level, labor market outcomes, legal status) and household characteristics (e.g., number of 
household members in Italy, family members abroad, housing). Unfortunately, ISMU data are not suitable to perform 
our main DiD analysis as they have no information on the month of arrival in Italy. See Dustmann et al. (forthcoming) 
for a description of these data. 
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not longitudinal and does not include legalized immigrants, it cannot be used to address this issue. 
Instead, we use again the ISMU survey to derive descriptive evidence on the persistence of the 
employment effect. The 2003 and 2004 waves of this survey contain information on whether the 
undocumented respondents had applied for the 2002 amnesty. Given that it took almost two years 
for the Italian authorities to process all applications, a significant share of applicants in both 2003 
and 2004 are still waiting for a response. 
After pooling the observations from the 2003 and 2004 waves we compare the employment 
probability of undocumented immigrant applicants who were not yet legalized with that of 
undocumented immigrants who had not applied. We first consider immigrants arrived in Italy in 
2001 at the latest (i.e., all qualified for amnesty) and we then focus exclusively on those arrived in 
2002. Consistently with the eligibility rules of the 2002 amnesty, the share of applicants among 
undocumented immigrants arrived in 2001 and earlier is around 75-81 percent, while it drops to 47 
percent among those arrived in year 2002 (see last row of Table 8). Although dissimilarities in 
outcomes between applicants and non-applicants may result primarily from selection into amnesty 
application, a statistically significant difference in employment between the two groups could still 
suggest that the effect of the amnesty may have been p rsistent.  
We run linear regressions of the probability of being employed on a dummy for amnesty 
application (equal to one if the respondent applied, z ro otherwise), on interview year and province 
of residence dummies and on individual controls (age, age squared, gender, years since migration 
and its square, and dummies for education and geographic area of origin). We run separate 
regressions for immigrants arrived in Italy in 1997-2001, 1999-2001, 2001 and 2002.  
Estimation results in Table 8 show that one to two years after the amnesty application period, 
the undocumented amnesty applicants have an employment rate that is 16–26 percentage points 
higher than that of the non-applicant undocumented immigrants. This coefficient is strongly 
significant and robust to gradual reduction of the sample size. This finding is in line with the size of 
the effect estimated from the Naga data and suggests that the effect was persistent. Further evidence 
26 
 
in this direction is provided by the Italian National Office of Statistics: an estimated 85 percent of 
the immigrants legalized under the 2002 amnesty managed to maintain legal employment in Italy 
and to renew the residence permit two years after legalization (Istat, 2008).  
 
[Table 8 approximately here] 
 
Persistence effects are possibly reinforced in the Italian legal framework, as the renewal of the 
two-year work and residence permit granted by the amnesty was also subject to being still 
employed (although changes in employers were allowed). This likely generated strong incentives 
for the immigrants to remain in employment.  
Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we take advantage of a natural experiment provided by a 2002 legalization 
program in Italy that conditioned eligibility both on a predetermined minimum residence 
requirement and on being employed at the time of application. Specifically, we exploit the 
exogenous discontinuity in eligibility based on date of arrival in the country, together with a unique 
dataset, to estimate the causal effect of the prospect of legalization on undocumented immigrants’ 
employment outcomes.  
Our empirical findings indicate that the prospect of legal status significantly improves the 
employment outcomes of immigrants that meet the arrival requirement relative to other 
undocumented immigrants. In particular, we estimate  statistically significant increase in 
employment probability of about 26 percentage points, a substantial effect roughly equivalent to 
half the increase in employment probability that undocumented immigrants normally experience 
during their first year in Italy. These findings are fully robust to several sensitivity and placebo 
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tests, as well as to the choice of alternative control groups. In addition, using a supplementary set of 
microdata, we suggest that these effects may persist ven some years after the amnesty. 
Overall, we make three main contributions to the lit rature on the effects of amnesty programs: 
First, unlike previous studies that have focused exclusively on the effect of gaining legal status for 
recently legalized immigrants, our paper is the first to consider the effect of the prospect of 
becoming legal on undocumented workers’ employment outcomes. In particular, we show that 
important changes may take place even before legalization actually occurs. Accordingly, our 
findings suggest that focusing just on the changes that eligible immigrants experience when they get 
legal status may underestimate the overall increase in employment probability induced by amnesty. 
Second, we study the labor market effect of a legalization program that conditions eligibility on 
being employed at the time of application, a type of amnesty design that, although common, has not 
as yet been studied. Finally, our novel and innovative research design has enabled us to study the 
effect of amnesty in a quasi-experimental setting using a clean identification strategy and an almost 
ideal comparison group. 
Given the frequent claim that one of amnesty’s main objectives is to safeguard the civil rights of 
undocumented migrants and prevent their exploitation in the labor market,25 the assessment of 
amnesty’s economic consequences on undocumented immigrants is crucial from a policy 
perspective. Our theoretical model suggests that amnesty programs that impose a requirement of 
employment at the moment of application generate important increases in immigrant labor supply 
that are likely to reinforce the employment effect. A similar effect can be expected in the context of 
temporary workers’ programs or other migration schemes that condition the issuance and/or 
renewal of a visa on having an employer willing to support the application. The shift in immigrants’ 
labor supply, however, although perhaps desirable in terms of the amnesty program’s efficacy in 
accelerating their labor market incorporation, may impose considerable costs on the immigrants 
                                                 
25 See, for example, The White House Fact Sheet on New Temporary Worker Program for Undocumented Immigrants, 
January 7, 2004; The White House Fact Sheet on Fixing our Broken Immigration System so Everyone Plays by the 
Rules, January 29, 2013; and Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1807/2007. 
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themselves. Indeed, immigrants with limited bargaining power in the labor market—as is likely for 
recently arrived undocumented immigrants (Borjas, 2016)—may be willing to accept drastic wage 
reductions in order to achieve legal status. Unfortuna ely, this issue is one our data prevent us from
empirically addressing. 
By granting amnesty, governments may generate an eco omic surplus, mainly from the positive 
value that immigrants and prospective employers attach to the prospect of legalization. The 
distribution of this surplus among the different agents involved (i.e., undocumented immigrants, 
employers, and government) may depend on the type of amnesty program implemented. In 
particular, our paper suggests that employment-based legalization initiatives may increase the scope 
for employers to appropriate the surplus. Hence, whatever the political stance on the best allocation 
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Figure 3. Average employment rate of undocumented immigrants (2000–2004) 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Note: Panel A reports means and standard deviations of selected characteristics of our main sample. The next two 
panels differentiate between immigrants arrived in Italy in April-May (qualified) and July-August (unqualified) in the 
amnesty year 2002 (Panel B) and in control years 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 (Panel C). Data for the individuals in all 
groups was collected on their first visit to Naga between November 14 and-January 13 in each year. The sample is 
composed of 581 individuals, 45 percent of which have “qualified” status. † denotes a difference betwen the treatment 













Employment mean 0.511 0.625 0.403 † 0.502 0.519
sd 0.500 0.489 0.495 0.501 0.501
Men mean 0.518 0.571 0.532 0.478 0.535
sd 0.500 0.499 0.503 0.501 0.500
Age mean 30.822 30.338 29.896 31.611 30.530
sd 8.678 7.581 9.061 9.011 8.540
Education
Primary mean 0.127 0.179 0.145 0.089 0.142
sd 0.334 0.386 0.355 0.285 0.350
Secondary mean 0.360 0.321 0.258 0.360 0.392
sd 0.480 0.471 0.441 0.481 0.489
High school mean 0.420 0.411 0.516 0.429 0.392
sd 0.494 0.496 0.504 0.496 0.489
University mean 0.093 0.089 0.081 0.123 0.073
sd 0.291 0.288 0.275 0.329 0.261
Origin
Europe mean 0.196 0.054 0.323 † 0.163 0.223 †
sd 0.397 0.227 0.471 0.370 0.417
Asia mean 0.090 0.054 0.065 0.089 0.104
sd 0.286 0.227 0.248 0.285 0.306
North Africa mean 0.203 0.250 0.274 0.192 0.185
sd 0.403 0.437 0.450 0.395 0.389
Sub-Saharan Africa mean 0.072 0.089 0.097 0.030 0.096 †
sd 0.259 0.288 0.298 0.170 0.295
Latin America mean 0.439 0.554 0.242 † 0.527 0.392 †
sd 0.497 0.502 0.432 0.500 0.489
Panel B Panel C




Table 2. DiD estimates: Main results 
 
 
Note: Each cell reports the estimated coefficient on the interaction between a dummy for arrival in April–May and a 
dummy for the amnesty year 2002 from linear regression  of a dummy for employment status on a dummy for arrival in 
Italy in April or May (versus July or August), dummies for years 2000–2004, and the interaction of the arrival dummy 
with the 2002 dummy. In panel A, which reports the amnesty effect, immigrants are observed between the 14th of 
November of each year and the 13th of January of the following year. In panel B, which hecks for initial differences in 
the two arrival groups, immigrants are observed betwe n the 1st and the 31st of September of each year. Columns 2–4 
gradually add in additional control variables. Gendr, age, and education controls include a male dummy, dummies for 
5-year age groups, and dummies for four education levels (primary, secondary, high school, university). Area of origin 
is denoted by dummies for five macro-areas of origin: Europe, Asia, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin 
America. Month dummies are dummy variables indicating he month in which an individual was observed. Panel B is 
based on a single month sample, thus column 4 is not rep rted. The last column displays the number of observations 
used in each regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1. 
  
1 2 3 4 obs.
Qualified status (β) 0.240** 0.236** 0.252** 0.262*** 581
[0.102] [0.102] [0.099] [0.100]
Qualified status (β) 0.034 0.033 0.054 - 419
[0.140] [0.138] [0.140]
Gender, age, education no yes yes yes
Area of origin no no yes yes
Month dummies no no no yes
Panel A - Amnesty effect
Panel B - Initial difference
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Table 3. Placebo tests: Qualified vs. Qualified and Unqualified vs. Unqualified 
 
 
Note: The first row reports the estimated coefficient on the interaction between a dummy for arrival in February–March 
vs. April–May and a dummy for the amnesty year 2002 from linear regressions of a dummy for employment sta us on a 
dummy for arrival in Italy in February or March (versus April or May), dummies for years 2000–2004, and the 
interaction of the arrival dummy with the 2002 dummy. Rows 2-4 have the same structure, but the arrival dummy is 
modified as described in each row’s heading. Immigrants are observed between the 14th of November of each year and 
the 13th of January of the following year. Columns 2–4 gradu lly add in additional control variables (controls are 
identical to those described in the note to Table 2). The last column displays the number of observations used in each 
regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1. 
1 2 3 4 obs.
Qualified (February-March) Vs Qualified (April-May) 0.061 0.061 0.037 0.035 503
[0.105] [0.104] [0.101] [0.102]
Qualified (April) Vs Qualified  (May) -0.043 -0.082 -0.094 -0.087 259
[0.148] [0.143] [0.142] [0.144]
Unqualified (July-August) Vs Unqualified (September-October) -0.024 -0.020 0.001 -0.002 793
[0.083] [0.084] [0.082] [0.081]
Unqualified (July) Vs Unqualified (August) -0.106 -0.128 -0.138 -0.115 322
[0.156] [0.162] [0.155] [0.148]
Gender, age, education no yes yes yes
Area of origin no no yes yes
Month dummies no no no yes
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Table 4. DiD robustness checks: Alternative control years 
 
Note: In both panels, each cell reports the estimated coefficient on the interaction between a dummy for arrival in April-
May and a dummy for the amnesty year 2002 from linear r gressions of a dummy for employment status on a dummy 
for arrival in Italy in April or May (versus July or August), year dummies, and the interaction of the arrival dummy with 
the 2002 dummy. Rows differ in the control years used in the analysis, as described in each row’s heading. In panel A, 
which reports the amnesty effect, immigrants are observed between the 14th of November of each year and the 13th of 
January of the following year. In panel B, which che ks for initial differences in the two arrival groups, immigrants are 
observed between the 1st and the 31st of September of each year. Columns 2–4 gradually add in additional control 
variables (controls are identical to those described in the note to Table 2). Panel B is based on a single month sample, 
thus column 4 is not reported. The last column displays the number of observations used in each regression. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1. 
1 2 3 4 obs.
2002 Vs (2003 & 2004) 0.280** 0.280** 0.321*** 0.323*** 295
[0.118] [0.118] [0.116] [0.116]
2002 Vs (2001 & 2003) 0.244** 0.253** 0.265** 0.266** 343
[0.113] [0.113] [0.111] [0.111]
2002 Vs (2000 & 2001) 0.216** 0.202* 0.197* 0.217** 404
[0.108] [0.109] [0.107] [0.108]
2002 Vs (2003 & 2004) -0.020 -0.003 -0.019 - 189
[0.154] [0.146] [0.156]
2002 Vs (2001 & 2003) 0.026 0.028 0.039 - 225
[0.150] [0.159] [0.157]
2002 Vs (2000 & 2001) 0.065 0.069 0.094 - 284
[0.146] [0.149] [0.150]
Gender, age, education no yes yes yes
Geo area no no yes yes
Month dummies no no no yes
Panel A - Amnesty effect
Panel B - Initial difference
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Table 5. Placebo amnesty years 
 
Note. In both panels, each cell reports the estimated coefficient on the interaction between a dummy for arrival in April-
May and a dummy for the placebo amnesty year indicated in each row’s heading, from linear regressions f a dummy 
for employment status on a dummy for arrival in Italy in April or May (versus July or August), year dummies, and the 
interaction of the arrival dummy with the placebo amnesty year dummy. In panel A, which reports the amnesty effect, 
immigrants are observed between the 14th of November of each year and the 13th of January of the following year. In 
panel B, which checks for initial differences in the two arrival groups, immigrants are observed betwen the 1st and the 
31st of September of each year.  Columns 2–4 gradually add in additional control variables (controls are id ntical to 
those described in the note to Table 2). Panel B is based on a single month sample, thus column 4 is not reported. The 
last column displays the number of observations used in each regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1. 
1 2 3 4 obs.
Placebo amnesty: 2000 0.110 0.128 0.137 0.139 463
[0.099] [0.098] [0.099] [0.099]
Placebo amnesty: 2001 -0.041 -0.042 -0.016 -0.021 463
[0.102] [0.102] [0.102] [0.102]
Placebo amnesty: 2003 0.043 0.033 0.017 0.011 463
[0.119] [0.117] [0.118] [0.119]
Placebo amnesty: 2004 -0.141 -0.153 -0.182 -0.173 463
[0.116] [0.115] [0.115] [0.115]
Placebo amnesty: 2000 -0.021 -0.034 -0.026 - 365
[0.102] [0.103] [0.104]
Placebo amnesty: 2001 -0.074 -0.071 -0.060 - 365
[0.112] [0.112] [0.113]
Placebo amnesty: 2003 0.118 0.139 0.130 - 365
[0.118] [0.121] [0.123]
Placebo amnesty: 2004 0.007 0.001 -0.018 - 365
[0.128] [0.125] [0.124]
Gender, age, education no yes yes yes
Area of origin no no yes yes
Month dummies no no no yes
Panel B - Initial difference
Panel A - Amnesty effect
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 Table 6. Year-by-year estimates 
 
Note: Each cell reports the estimated coefficient o a dummy for arrival in April–May from linear regressions of a 
dummy for employment status on a constant and a dummy for arrival in Italy in April or May (versus July or August). 
Results for the amnesty year 2002 and for all other non-amnesty years are reported in separate rows. Immigrants are 
observed between the 14th of November of each year and the 13th of January of the following year. Columns 2–4 
gradually add in additional control variables (contr ls are identical to those described in the note t Table 2). The last 
column displays the number of observations used in each regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1. 
 
  
1 2 3 4 obs.
Amnesty year
2002 0.222** 0.217** 0.198** 0.212** 118
[0.091] [0.095] [0.095] [0.099]
Placebo years
2000 0.057 0.037 0.014 0.013 147
[0.081] [0.086] [0.091] [0.093]
2001 -0.046 -0.055 -0.049 -0.049 139
[0.085] [0.091] [0.091] [0.091]
2003 0.017 0.034 0.038 0.042 86
[0.108] [0.109] [0.117] [0.120]
2004 -0.132 -0.113 -0.149 -0.138 91
[0.104] [0.107] [0.117] [0.120]
Gender, age, education no yes yes yes
Area of origin no no yes yes
Month dummies no no no yes
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Table 7. Alternative control groups 
 
Note: This table reports results of DiD regressions where qualified (arrived in April–May; columns 1-3 and 7-9) and, separately, unqualified (arrived in July-August; 
columns 4-6 and 10-12) immigrants in the Naga sample are compared to alternative control groups of legal immigrants and natives. In Panel A, the four control groups are 
extracted from the ISMU sample and are defined as follows: i) legal immigrants who have spent less than four years in Italy and live in Milan; ii) legal immigrants who 
have spent less than four years in Italy and live in Lombardy; iii) legal immigrants who have spent less than two years in Italy and live in Milan; iv) legal immigrants who 
have spent less than two years in Italy and live in Lombardy. In Panel B, the control group is extracted from the EULFS sample, and is composed of all legal residents 
(immigrants and natives) of Lombardy. In all cases, the control group is restricted to individuals aged 15 to 40. We further restrict the control groups to unskilled 
individuals in columns 1-6, whereas we consider all levels of education in columns 7-12. Each cell repo ts the estimated coefficient on a dummy for being qualified in 
Naga sample in linear regressions of a dummy for employment status on a constant, the variable of interes  and year dummies. Gender, age, and education controls include 
a male dummy, dummies for 5-year age groups, and dummies for four education levels (primary, secondary, high school, university). Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and *p<0.1. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
i) Milan: legal immigrants, ysm <=4 0.384*** 0.334*** 0.332*** 0.013 -0.031 -0.030 0.346*** 0.288*** 0.291*** -0.029 -0.074 -0.072
[0.109] [0.112] [0.111] [0.115] [0.115] [0.113] [0.100] [0.103] [0.103] [0.106] [0.107] [0.106]
Observations 728 728 728 747 747 747 1,755 1,755 1,755 1,774 1,774 1,774
ii) Lombardy: legal immigrants, ysm <=4 0.350*** 0.297*** 0.299*** -0.024 -0.048 -0.047 0.334*** 0.283*** 0.294*** -0.041 -0.065 -0.065
[0.097] [0.105] [0.103] [0.104] [0.108] [0.106] [0.096] [0.101] [0.101] [0.103] [0.105] [0.105]
Observations 3,435 3,431 3,431 3,454 3,450 3,450 6,964 6,956 6,956 6,983 6,975 6,975
iii) Milan: legal immigrants, ysm <=2 0.305** 0.260** 0.260** -0.058 -0.103 -0.101 0.328*** 0.282** 0.282** -0.047 -0.083 -0.084
[0.129] [0.131] [0.129] [0.133] [0.132] [0.131] [0.107] [0.109] [0.110] [0.112] [0.113] [0.113]
Observations 348 348 348 367 367 367 789 789 789 808 808 808
iv) Lombardy: legal immigrants, ysm <=2 0.279*** 0.252** 0.257** -0.099 -0.104 -0.101 0.285*** 0.257** 0.271*** -0.093 -0.098 -0.099
[0.101] [0.109] [0.107] [0.107] [0.111] [0.109] [0.098] [0.104] [0.104] [0.104] [0.107] [0.107]
Observations 1,352 1,351 1,351 1,371 1,370 1,370 2,856 2,854 2,854 2,875 2,873 2,873
v) Lombardy: all residents 0.218** 0.166* 0.197** -0.109 -0.110 -0.102 0.216** 0.176** 0.206** -0.112 -0.116 -0.121
[0.088] [0.091] [0.091] [0.097] [0.100] [0.099] [0.088] [0.087] [0.089] [0.097] [0.098] [0.097]
Observations 11,417 11,417 11,417 11,450 11,450 11,450 27,315 27,315 27,315 27,348 27,348 27,348
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Gender and age no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Education no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Panel A - ISMU sample (2001-2004)
Panel B - EULFS (2000-2004)
Unskilled All
Qualified Unqualified Qualified Unqualified
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Table 8. Persistence of the eligibility effect on undocumented immigrants’ employment status  
 
Note: Each cell reports the estimated coefficient of an indicator for amnesty applicants in regression f a dummy for employment status on a dummy that equals one if the 
respondent applied for the 2002 amnesty (and zero otherwise), on year and province dummies and on individual controls (age, age squared, gender, years since migration 
and its square, and dummies for education, and for ge graphic area of origin). Regressions are estimated on the sample of all undocumented immigrants whohave arrived 
in Italy in 1997-2001 (cols. 1–2), 1999-2001 (cols. 3–4), 2001 (cols. 5–6), or 2002 (cols. 7–8). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and 
*p<0.1. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2002 Amnesty applicant 0.163*** 0.169*** 0.227*** 0.234*** 0.255*** 0.261*** 0.166*** 0.162***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.042] [0.041] [0.049] [0.048] [0.035] [0.035]
Year and province dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual controls no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 1,172 1,172 793 793 457 457 615 615
Share of applicants 0.79 0.81 0.75 0.47
Year(s) of arrival in Italy








This appendix outlines a stylized model to elucidate the labor market effects of immigration 
amnesty on potentially eligible undocumented migrants. We first sketch a Nash-bargaining model 
of the labor market and then study how different amnesty designs affect immigrants’ outcomes. 
The Labor Market 
Consider the problem of firm f, which must decide whether to employ an undocumented 
immigrant. The marginal productivity of the immigrant is constant (A >0) and with probability 
0p ≥  s/he will be apprehended by the police, the match expires, and the firm incur a sanction 
( 0)fc ≥  for having unlawfully employed the undocumented worker. The firm finds it profitable to 
employ the undocumented immigrant as long as the exp cted gain exceeds the wage. The solution 
to the firm’s problem thus defines labor demand in terms of the maximum wage ( )fw p  that the 
firm is willing to pay to employ an undocumented worker for any given level of p: 
 ( ) (1 )f fw p p A p c= − ⋅ − ⋅  (A1)  
Here, ( )fw p  is linearly decreasing in p, and for 0p = , the salary equals the worker’s marginal 
productivity ( fw A= ).  
We next consider the choice of an undocumented immigrant m who must decide whether to 
accept or reject a job offer. This worker will accept the offer if the wage is larger than the 
opportunity cost of not working ( 0)b ≥ , where both terms are weighted by one minus the probability 
of apprehension. If found out, s/he will incur a penalty ( 0)mc ≥ , which can be interpreted in terms 
of detention time and/or the economic and psychological cost of deportation. The undocumented 
immigrant finds it profitable to accept the job offer if the expected gain from working is larger than 
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or equal to the expected gain from not working; i.e., (1 ) (1 )m mp w p c p b p c− ⋅ − ⋅ ≥ − ⋅ − ⋅ . 26 This 
condition defines a flat labor supply: 
 ( )mw p b=   (A2) 
Where ( )mw p denotes the immigrant’s reservation wage. If the margin l productivity of the match 
is higher than the individual’s utility of not working (i.e. if A b> ), equations (A1) and (A2) 
identify an apprehension probability p such that ( ) ( )f mw p w p= .  
Define the job match surplus ( ) ( ) ( )f mS p w p w p= − . When the apprehension probability is 
sufficiently low (i.e.,p p≤ ), the surplus is positive, ( ) 0S p ≥ , but when p p> , it is ( ) 0S p < , so 
there is no possibility of a mutually profitable match between the firm and worker. We therefore 
focus on cases in whichp p≤ .  
To close the model, we assume that the firm and the worker negotiate the wage according to 
standard Nash bargaining: 
[ ] [ ]{ }ββ −= 1)()(maxarg)( pSpSpw mf      (A3) 
where ( )w p  is the equilibrium wage of a successful match; ( ) ( ) ( )f fS p w p w p= −  and 
( ) ( ) ( )m mS p w p w p= −  are the surpluses of the match for the firm and worker, respectively, and 
( )0,1β ∈  and )1( β−  their respective bargaining power. Problem (A3) yields to the equilibrium 
wage ( ) ( ) ( )fw p w p S pβ= − , and the total surplus of the match is shared proportionally based on 
the bargaining strength of the firm and worker: ( ) ( )fS p S pβ=  and ( )( ) 1 ( )mS p S pβ= − . 
Amnesty 
This model can be used to illustrate the labor market effects of amnesty eligibility. We capture 
the prospect of legalization in three complementary wa s: First, the probability of apprehension is 
                                                 
26 Here, for analytical convenience, the probability of apprehension is independent on the employment status. The 
apprehension probability of workers is likely to vary across occupations (e.g. relatively low for domestic occupations 
and much higher in construction and services) and we have no a priori on the ranking between workers, in general, and 
unemployed immigrants. Below, we introduce a twist in he apprehension probability for employed and unemployed 
individuals in order to capture one important feature of work-related regularization programs. 
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lower for eligible than for ineligible immigrants )10( <<≤ ie pp . This condition is appropriate if the 
time span between eligibility and application is not too long. Second, immigrants attach a positive 
value (B) to the prospect of legal status, because they anticipate all the advantages of residing 
lawfully in the host country (e.g., access to the financial and legal systems, travel home, and so 
forth). Third, we introduce a positive cost T of amnesty application, which is borne by the firm and 
comprises payroll taxes and fines. Whether T is formally levied on the firm or the worker is 
immaterial for the results. Here, we apply these constructs to assess the effects of two different 
amnesty designs. 
Predetermined conditions only 
 
Consider first an amnesty program that conditions eligibility on some predetermined individual 
conditions (residence, employment, or both). Those individuals that satisfy (do not satisfy) the 
predetermined condition are eligible (ineligible) for amnesty. We denote these two groups with the 
superscripts m=(e, i). It is then easy to verify that, because under this amnesty design both the 
potential reward B and the probability of apprehensio  are independent of being employed or not, 
labor supply (A2) remains unchanged for both eligible and ineligible immigrants. The prospect of 
legalization will, however, shift the labor demand for eligible immigrants, which now becomes 
( ), ( ) (1 )f e e e e fw p p A T p c= − ⋅ − − ⋅     (A4) 
Eligibility for legal status thus has an ambiguous labor demand effect: a lower probability of 
apprehension e ip p<  drives , ( )f e ew p  up, while the application fee T shifts the , ( )f e ew p  curve 
downward. If the former effect dominates, the value of a match with an eligible undocumented 
immigrant increases, implying 
( ) ( )e e i iS p S p> .      (A5) 
Hence, the maximum wage that the firm is willing to pay for an eligible worker is higher than that 
for an ineligible worker: ( , ,( ) ( )f e e f i iw p w p> ). 
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Predetermined conditions and current employment requirement 
 
Consider next an amnesty program that entails both a predetermined condition and a current 
employment requirement. This design inherently divides undocumented immigrants into one group 
that satisfies the first requirement and another that does not. Following the terminology adopted in 
the main text, we define these two groups of immigrants as “qualified” and “unqualified,” 
respectively. Conditional on being employed, the former group becomes fully eligible for legal 
status. Hence, we must now distinguish four different groups of immigrants, ( ), , ,m e i q u= , with e 
and i still denoting eligible and ineligible immigrants but q and u denoting the group of qualified 
and unqualified immigrants, respectively.  
In terms of our modeling assumptions, this amnesty design has two main consequences. First, 
employed qualified immigrants become fully eligible and thus face an apprehension probability 
q e i
employed
p p p= < . If they do not become employed, however (i.e., if they fail to become fully 
eligible for amnesty), their probability of being detected is equal to that of unqualified immigrants, 
and both are simply equal to the probability of apprehension of an ineligible immigrant: 
q u i
u n m p loyed
p p p= = . The above observation allows us to simplify the notation by using m=e (m=i) 
to denote employed (unemployed) qualified immigrants. Second, the reward B is now conditional 
on being employed.  
It now follows that both labor demand and supply may be affected by the amnesty, although 
only for qualified immigrants. In particular, labor demand for qualified immigrants is still described 
by equation (A4) since this group of immigrants becomes eligible if employed and faces an 
apprehension probability ep . Hence, the labor supply of qualified immigrants is now determined by 
the following problem: 
( )(1 ) (1 )e e m i i mp w B p c p b p c− ⋅ + − ⋅ ≥ − ⋅ − ⋅    (A6) 














     (A7) 
where (1 )i i mb p b p c= − ⋅ − ⋅% . The reservation wage ( )e ew p  is increasing in the probability of being 








= ∞ . Comparing (A7) with (A2) then shows that the 
prospect of legalization for qualified immigrants unambiguously reduces their reservation wage as a 
consequence of both the lower risk of apprehension and the reward B associated with employment. 
Given that unqualified/ineligible immigrants do not change their labor supply, then 
( ) ( )i i e ew p w p> . It should also be noted that when B is high enough, a negative reservation wage 
for eligible immigrants cannot be ruled out. Moreovr, if the bargaining power of undocumented 
workers is low ( 1β ≈ ), the equilibrium wage ( )w p  is close to the reservation wage ( )mw p  for both 
groups, ( ),m e i= , and the regularization program unambiguously reduc s the wage of qualified 
immigrants. This downward pressure on wages is absent in amnesty programs that condition 
eligibility on predetermined individual characteristic  only. 
Figure A 2 graphically illustrates the labor market effects of an amnesty program that conditions 
eligibility on current employment and some predetermined condition. The dotted lines , ( )f iw p  and 
( )iw p  represent the labor demand and labor supply, respectively, of unqualified, and hence 
ineligible, undocumented immigrants. The intersection of the two curves identifies a region of the 
apprehension probability in which a profitable match is possible 0,p p ∈   . 
ip  denotes the 
probability of apprehension for unqualified/ineligible immigrants, and ( )i iS p  is the total surplus, 
which is split between employer and employee according to parameter β . On the demand side, the 
prospect of legalization does two things: (a) shift the labor demand curve downward to , ( )f ew p  
(so the intercept is now A-T) and (b) reduces the apprehension probability to e ip p<  for qualified 
immigrants only. At ep  the demand for qualified workers becomes D’ . If the labor supply were to 
remain unchanged, the associated surplus ( )e eS p would be ether greater or lower than the initial 
49 
 
surplus ( )i iS p  depending on model parameterization. The prospect of legalization, however, 
completely changes the supply of qualified immigrants, which becomes ( )ew p . For ip p= , 
( )e iw p b B= − . To the left of ipp = , the reservation wage is monotonically decreasing in p. 
( )e eS p  is the total surplus of a successful job match with a qualified immigrant. In this specific 
graphical representation, ( ) ( )e e i iS p S p> . 
In general, the net change in surplus of potential m tches remains ambiguous because of the 
indeterminacy of the shift in labor demand. It is readily apparent, however, that if the value the 
immigrant attaches to the prospect of legalization is high enough (if B T≥ ), then condition (A5) 




As explained in the main text, whenever (A5) is satisfied, the firm will increase both the 
retention rate of already employed qualified/eligible workers and the hiring rate of unemployed 
qualified workers (who then become fully eligible for amnesty). Those who do not satisfy the 
predetermined condition (the unqualified ones), in contrast, are simply left out of the legalization 
process and experience no change in surplus. It thus follows that, ceteris paribus, the employment 






>  (A8)  
The opposite would hold if the net effect of the shift  in labor demand and labor supply led to a 
larger job surplus for ineligible than for eligible immigrants. 
Although this model could be enriched in many direct ons—for instance, by introducing 
additional channels that might shape the predicted effect of an amnesty on the labor market 
outcomes of undocumented immigrants—its main conclusion that important changes in the labor 
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market may take place even before the actual legalization occurs would still hold. The direction of 
these effects on the relative employment of qualified versus unqualified immigrants, however, 
remains theoretically ambiguous and needs to be addressed empirically. 
 
Appendix 2 - Possible misreporting of arrival date and selective return 
migration 
 
As discussed in the main text, although misreporting of the arrival date and selective return 
migration are unlikely to drive our results – due to the nature of the dataset and the very short time 
window used in the analysis – we can empirically test for any evidence of the two sources of bias. 
Our test is based on the fact that, in the presence of s lective outmigration and/or misreporting, we 
should observe that immigrants who went to Naga in the Fall of 2002 were systematically more 
likely to report arriving in Italy before June of the same year than immigrants who went to Naga in 
the Fall of non-amnesty years. Thus, we should observe a change in the distribution of the arrival 
date around the 2002 threshold date relative to non-am esty years.  
To test this possibility, we perform the following empirical check. We use the APMAY dummy 
as the dependent variable. In each year, this dummy is equal to one if the individual reported having 
arrived in April or May and zero if s/he arrived in July or August (of the same year). As in the 
remainder of our analysis, individuals who arrived in other months are dropped from the estimation 
sample. Pooling the observations for years 2000–2004 (which is exactly our regression sample), we 
run linear probability models of the probability of having arrived in April-May over a constant and 
dummies for non-amnesty years (2000, 2001 2003, and 2004; 2002 is omitted as the benchmark 
year). The constant term measures the share of individuals who arrived in Italy in April and May 
2002, while the year dummies measure the percentage point differences in this share between 2002 
and each of the four non-amnesty years.  
The results are reported in Table A2. Column 1 reports the unconditional estimates, while the 
following three columns gradually add in groups of c ntrols (gender, age and education, and 
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dummies for area of origin, and month). Looking specifically at the unconditional estimates in 
column 1 of Table A2, the estimated coefficient on the constant term indicates that the immigrants 
who arrived in Italy in 2002 are almost evenly distributed between the two arrival groups. No 
systematic differences in this share are observed in any of the remaining four years: the estimated 
coefficients on the year dummies for 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004 are very small and not 
significantly different from zero. The inclusion of further controls in columns 2–4 does not alter this
conclusion. These results provide truly reassuring evidence against the existence of selective 
outmigration or systematic arrival date misreporting i  our data. The estimation results using probit 
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Table A 1. Comparison of NAGA and ISMU samples 
 
Note: The table reports means and standard deviations of selected characteristics for the NAGA and ISMU samples. 
The Naga sample includes all immigrants in our main estimating sample observed, respectively, in year 2002 (panel A) 
and in the entire period 2000-2004 (panel B). The ISMU sample include all immigrants who reported to lack legal 
status and to have at most one year of residence in Italy and who were interviewed in the Milan province in, 
respectively, year 2002 (panel A) and the period 2001-2004 (panel B). † denotes a difference between th  two samples 
that is significant at least at 5%. 
NAGA ISMU NAGA ISMU
Men mean 0.551 0.664 0.518 0.655 †
sd 0.500 0.475 0.500 0.476
Age mean 30.106 30.858 30.822 29.879
sd 8.359 9.724 8.678 8.649
University education mean 0.085 0.088 0.093 0.114
sd 0.280 0.285 0.291 0.318
Origin
Europe mean 0.195 0.301 0.196 0.228
sd 0.398 0.461 0.397 0.420
Asia mean 0.059 0.062 0.090 0.060
sd 0.237 0.242 0.286 0.238
North Africa mean 0.263 0.115 † 0.203 0.125 †
sd 0.442 0.320 0.403 0.331
Sub-Saharan Africa mean 0.093 0.062 0.072 0.123 †
sd 0.292 0.242 0.259 0.329
Latin America mean 0.390 0.460 0.439 0.463
sd 0.490 0.501 0.497 0.499
2002 (amnesty year) Full sample
Panel A Panel B
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Table A 2. Probability of having arrived in Italy in  April-May (versus July-August) 
 
Note: The table reports results from linear regressions of a dummy for arrival in April-May (versus July or August) on a 
constant and year dummies (excluding 2002). Columns 2–4 gradually add in additional control variables (controls are 
identical to those described in the note to Table 2). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and 
*p<0.1. 
1 2 3 4
Arrival year 2000 -0.053 -0.075 -0.093 -0.090
[0.062] [0.062] [0.060] [0.060]
Arrival year 2001 -0.007 -0.013 -0.03 -0.026
[0.063] [0.065] [0.065] [0.065]
Arrival year 2003 0.002 0.005 0.000 -0.001
[0.071] [0.072] [0.071] [0.071]
Arrival year 2004 -0.09 -0.092 -0.065 -0.057
[0.069] [0.069] [0.068] [0.068]
Constant 0.475*** 0.328 0.324 0.342
[0.046] [0.206] [0.215] [0.219]
Observations 581 581 581 581
Gender, age, education no yes yes yes
Area of origin no no yes yes
Month dummies no no no yes
